The Sixth District Court of Appeal filed a decision heavy on writ procedure in the case Alliance of Concerned Citizens Organized for Responsible Development on November 26, 2018 (Case No. H044410). The heavy focus on procedure in the Court’s decision doesn’t make for the most exciting reading, but the decision contains an important reminder for lead agencies and applicants: any relief granted pursuant to CEQA must be limited.

In this case, the City of San Juan Bautista prepared an IS/MND for a fuel station, convenience store, and fast casual restaurant near SR 156. Project opponents challenged approval of the MND, arguing that an EIR was necessary. In a March 2016 decision, the trial court granted a “Peremptory Writ of Mandate of Interlocutory Remand for Reconsideration of Potential Noise Impacts.” The trial court cited CEQA section 21168.9 to sever the issue of potential noise impacts while rejecting the remainder of the challenges brought by petition.

Section 21168.9 requires that a mandate order in CEQA litigation be in the form of a “peremptory writ of mandate specifying what action by the public agency is necessary to comply.” Furthermore, this peremptory writ must “include only those actions which are necessary to achieve compliance with [CEQA] and only those specific project activities in noncompliance with [CEQA].” (Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21168.9, subd. (b).)

Project opponents did not challenge the limited peremptory writ issued by the trial court in March 2016. Later, City filed a return to the writ and requested entry of final judgment. Project opponents opposed the return and proposed final judgment, and the trial court rejected the opposition arguments in a December 2016 decision.

Project opponents appealed the trial court’s December 2016 decision, but the Sixth District Court of Appeal determined that the March 2016 decision served as the final judgment in the proceedings, despite being labeled “interlocutory.” The Court of Appeal reviewed substance over form of the peremptory writ, and concluded that the March 2016 writ complied with the section 21168.9, and served as the final determination of the parties’ rights in the case.